With the emergence of chip hardware attacks, the traditional vulnerability protection system based on software and cryptography is facing threats. Taking hardware Trojan and fault injection attack as research objects, the detection technology analysis was carried out on the chip hardware security, and the protection measures were put forward. Hardware Trojan takes temperature and voltage as trigger conditions. When the trigger conditions are met, Trojan circuit sends an excitation signal to Trojan function module to destroy the circuit logic. Hardware Trojan detection method includes destructive detection and non-destructive detection, among which the non-destructive detection equipment and detection complexity are low and the applicability is good. Fault injection attack is an external physical attack, which artificially generates circuit faults and introduces them into the target system by establishing a certain fault model. Fault injection attack protection including non-intrusive, semi-intrusive and intrusive were proposed. In practical application, they should be flexibly selected according to the fault injection mode.
Key words
Hardware Trojan /
Fault Injection Attack /
Cryptography /
Chip /
Safety Protection Technology /
Detection Technology
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Footnotes
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